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Abstract 
 
This article will challenge the notion of the 'local' as a static identity or set position, and 
instead argue for a processual understanding of localisation. In that sense, constant 
processes of delocalisation and (re-)localisation serve as tools in which peacebuilding 
actors position themselves in the political economy and the social landscape of 
peacebuilding. Peacebuilding agency and identity are therefore viewed as situated in time 
and space and subject to constant transformation. Referring to the cases of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Cyprus, I argue that the positionality of local identity is contingent on the 
ever-changing social context and political economy of peacebuilding. By viewing processes 
of (re-)localisation and delocalisation as markers of agency, we can overcome the binary 
between local and international and instead investigate more subtle forms of agency in a 
fluid peacebuilding environment. To this end, this article identifies the ways in which 
peacebuilding agency facilitates the creation of a particular set of identities 
(identification), before investigating the processes of delocalisation and (re-)localisation in 
detail. The article goes on to argue that, rather than being mutually exclusive, those two 
processes tend to happen in parallel and thus challenge the seemingly neat binary between 
local and international peacebuilding identities.  
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Introduction 
 
In recent years, in both peacebuilding practice and research about it, we have come to realise 
a growing interest in the ‘local’.i Such discourses have developed in a binary form though, 
from the demonization to the glorification of local agency. Such competing discourses reflect 
the portfolio of diverse local imaginaries, ranging from the notion of the Western local that 
needs to be saved, to the local from which the West has to be saved.
1
 Such perspectives on 
the assumption that local actors are either inferior to international actors, or barbaric and a 
threat to the West.
ii
 And yet, perhaps there is more to local identity than this binary approach, 
which ends up creating an artificial neat distinction between local and international, or even 
Western, agency. Indeed, as this article will argue, the binary construction of discourses 
around peacebuilding identity risks simplifying a more complex picture of identity-formation.  
Against this background, there is a need to challenge the notion of the ‘local’ as static and 
victim of what is being done onto it. Instead, the article will suggest that peacebuilding 
agency and the identity categories that actors create for themselves are fluid, transversal and 
movable, with actors constantly resituating themselves between competing forces of 
identification. Representing one particular manifestation of agency, peacebuilding agency refers 
to transformative processes aiming to improve the social conditions of everyday life.
iii
 This, however, 
does not necessarily imply that peacebuilding agency is good in nature as it refers to the subjective 
perspective and strategies of the respective actor.
iv
 It rather relates to the social practices of actors in 
the light of their transformative ambitions.
v 
The two centres of gravity between which identity formation meanders, particularly in 
peacebuilding contexts, are the two poles of ‘local-international’. Actors tend to be labelled 
as part of an ‘international community’ or a ‘local community’.vi Interestingly, even in 
peacebuilding research, we seem to rely on these categories to quickly assess to what extent 
policies or norms of any particular actor are legitimate, authoritarian, top-down, bottom-up, 
representative or oppressive. Such observations tend to represent snapshots in time and space. 
However, what this article suggests is to challenge the primordial notion of peacebuilding 
identity and instead look at the processes through which actors situate themselves in a 
particular position in society, taking into account the fluidity of identity-formation as well as 
the need to rethink our ‘snapshot approach’ in favour of an approach which allows for 
competing forces of identification to be deployed at the same time as well as the changing 
nature of processes over time. It is in this complex landscape that peacebuilding actors 
                                                          
1
 Many thanks to Neil Cooper for pointing this out to me.  
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constantly navigate and in which they make decisions in terms of which position they occupy 
in peacebuilding networks and connections. Against this background, this article suggests 
that rather than acting in a static way, actors constantly reposition themselves vis-à-vis the 
‘local’ and ‘the global’. Depending on time and context, they delocalise or (re-)localise their 
identities and are therefore in constant movement. These processes tend to act in parallel and 
reflect the complexity of identity and identification in politically contested and multi-layered 
processes, such as peacebuilding. 
This article is based on the experiences I have personally made as a researcher conducting 
‘fieldwork’ (a term which is problematic in itself) in different contexts, including Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Cyprus. Starting with the assumption that there is friction or divergence 
between local and international approaches to peacebuilding, I was inclined to think of the 
peacebuilding actors I met as either international and thus top-down-oriented; or local and 
thus knowledgeable of local context and conditions. However, I increasingly realised that this 
very act of labelling actors as ‘local’ or ‘international’ brought with it its own tensions and 
problems in that actors de facto not only cross neat categories of local and international (in 
terms of where their loyalties and networks are located), but also that the labelling of one’s 
own and other’s identities can change over time, depending on the social, political, and 
economic context. In that sense, the attempt to label actors as local or international was in 
many instances not a case of neat analytical distinction, but rather a political decision in terms 
of which biases and authorities to ascribe to those actors, and how to read them academically. 
This in turn represents the context in which I had to rethink my own categories and labels, in 
line with the ways in which actors represent themselves vis-à-vis policy actors or academics. 
These forms of representation in turn shed light on the identity politics of peacebuilding, in 
terms of which identities are privileged or discouraged, and how the values attached to 
certain labels shape the discourses and (funding) practices of powerful peacebuilding actors.  
 
Against this background, the article will first briefly outline the complexities of identity 
formation in peacebuilding contexts more generally, before specifically looking at processes 
of delocalisation and (re-)localisation more specifically. The article will investigate the extent 
to which such processes take place in parallel and illustrate how this challenges the binary of 
‘local versus international’, which is often taken for granted, not only in the policy world, but 
also in academic research.  
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Peacebuilding and its mechanisms of identity construction 
Only recently has peacebuilding been linked to issues of representation, identity and 
power, against the background that it refers to a set of policies which represent their agents 
and recipients in a particular way.
vii
 Indeed, there is a growing acknowledgement that 
building peace in post-conflict societies involves certain notions of ‘self’ and ‘other’, linked 
to techniques of representation and the creation of specific identities.
viii
 
In this context, it is particularly relevant to look at Bhabha’s interpretation of colonial 
forms of representation, which he considers as characterised by their ‘fixity’ and disavowal of 
difference, which ‘connote[s] rigidity and an unchanging order as well as disorder, 
degeneracy and daemonic repetition’.ix To support this argument, Brown suggests that this is 
linked to a process of ‘othering’ through the representation of the ‘other’ as fixed and 
unchangeable to serve ‘the interests of the idealized “self”’.x In this context, Said emphasises 
that representation is always a political choice.
xi
 Indeed, classifications cannot be considered 
to be neutral labels, but are highly contested
xii
 as well as based on processes of simplification, 
exclusion and selection.
xiii
 Moreover, Brown claims that the ability to categorise and label 
things, people or collectivities reflects power and exercises control by ascribing rules and 
values to the object of representation.
xiv
 In such processes of representing and creating labels, 
the ‘other’ is controlled by the representational creation of difference and distance. In policy-
making, this goes hand in hand with an assumption of difference and distance between the 
knower and the known.
xv
 At the same time, this does not only apply to the attempts to label or 
categorise the ‘other’, but also the ‘self’. Actors situate others, but also themselves, in a 
relational position, based on the respective context in time and space.  
Therefore it becomes clear that boundaries between identities are constructed, open to 
transformation and social.
xvi
 There is no ‘single’ identity, but identities tend to be multiple 
and contextual. Sen has argued that everyone has parallel identities, so people choose about 
the importance they attach to each of those identities out of a specific situation.
xvii
 Sen indeed 
suggests that ‘identities are robustly plural’.xviii This process of deliberately framing identity 
in a particular way, can be considered a process of identification. Hence, people are not just 
victims regarding which identities are constructed by the very structures around them, but 
they play an active part in which identities they consider as salient in any given context. In 
that vein, Hall points to the discursive nature of identification and suggests a clear link 
between agency and identity.
xix
 He suggests that we need to understand identities ‘as 
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produced in specific historical and institutional sites’.xx We can thus consider peacebuilding 
as a specific historical and institutional site in the framework of which processes of 
identification take place, subject to change and transformation over space and time. 
In relation to peacebuilding, the extent to which actors label themselves as local or 
international, or indeed both, is highly variable and connected to one’s position as a local or 
international actor. Peacebuilding identity, that is, the labels actors are positioned with and 
position themselves with during a process of peacebuilding, is therefore highly time- and 
space- dependent. Processes of identification can present themselves in the form of resistance 
as much as of compliance, depending on the strategies that actors choose to use in their 
search to position themselves in the peacebuilding landscape. This ties in with Bakić-
Hayden’s ‘nesting orientalisms’ concept, pointing to the fact that compliance is not just a 
passive category, but reflects the agency of local actors to appropriate discourses of 
Balkanism to ‘recycle’ them for their own benefits.xxi   
The process of positioning oneself in the wider peacebuilding landscape can be 
considered as taking on the form of delocalisation (the deliberate attempt to avoid one’s 
identity being framed as ‘local’) or (re-)localisation (the decision to frame one’s identity as 
‘local’), or even both at the same time. This points to the situational logic of peacebuilding, 
which requires actors on the ground to define themselves as part of a certain peacebuilding 
logic, with the assumption that ‘local’ and ‘international’ identities are in a mutual frictional 
relationship. In fact, the political economy of peacebuilding, that is, the finances tied to 
certain projects, require that agencies clarify their position. Are they internal or external?
xxii
 
Are they local or international project partners? Such questions assume that categories of 
local-international help determine the position of any given actor in the peacebuilding 
landscape. At the same time, actors not only play according to the rules as dictated by the 
surrounding structures, but play out their agency in terms of making deliberate decisions in 
how to present themselves vis-à-vis cooperating and competing actors in any given 
peacebuilding context. The identities that actors choose to assume in the peacebuilding 
context can thus be said to impact upon their relationship with powerful actors, such as 
donors, and thus their potential access to resources. Actors will usually be funded or 
supported in their particular role and identity vis-à-vis the respective (post-)conflict society. 
In this context, the cases of Cyprus and Bosnia-Herzegovina lend themselves to further 
investigation, given the contested nature of identity and identification in these cases. In both 
of these cases, this is coupled with a political economy of financial peace-related funds 
coming in, and increasingly becoming scarce. As a result, the peacebuilding economy has had 
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to strongly rely on international funds, coupled with the presence of a variety of international 
actors. The interplay between different local and international identities in turn is illustrative 
of the contested nature of identification in a peacebuilding context.  
 
Delocalisation 
 
Theoretical and policy discourses have long implied the notion of ‘backwardness’ to local 
identity. Policy documents often connect the ‘local’ to critiques of a ‘lack of progress’, ‘lack 
of capacities’, ‘problems’, ‘failure’, and so on.xxiii Academically speaking, discourses about 
the ‘local’ in peacebuilding contexts are shaped by Orientalismxxiv or, more geographically 
specifically, ‘Balkanism’, which, according to Bjelić, characterises the Balkans as a 
backwards-oriented discursive locality in order to establish a hierarchy in which the Balkans 
and its people are viewed as inferior to the West.
xxv
 In a similar vein, Autesserre outlines how 
local mechanisms of conflict resolution have often been labelled as illegitimate in contrast to 
liberal conceptions of peacebuilding that stress their own legitimacy in their attempts to 
create channels through which change and social transformation can be catalysed.
xxvi
 To give 
but one policy example, a UNDP discussion paper on local peace committees clearly implies 
that conflict is primarily ‘local’ in nature, thus requires local solutions which, amongst others 
should ‘[e]liminate conditions detrimental to peaceful relations and peace agreements’.xxvii 
This approach implies that the sources of conflict tend to stem primarily from local roots and 
are thus in need of resolution at that level. At the same time, this denies or at least plays down 
international dynamics which may, directly or indirectly, have contributed to the conflict in 
question. Here, international dynamics are thus not addressed as part of a wider picture of the 
conflict. It is, for instance, quite interesting that the outbreak of the war in the former 
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s is often analysed as a local civil war or a result of ethnicised 
local politics,
xxviii
 while there are comparatively only few studies on the international 
contributions to this war.
xxix
  
 
Interestingly we can observe a tendency of such discourses, blaming local dynamics and 
identities for the emergence of conflict, to not only be reproduced in the West, but they are 
often also found in ‘local’ discourses as well. Indeed, when conducting research in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, I regularly found Bosnians telling me they thought that their own society 
needed external help or was incapable of bringing about change themselves. This is often 
linked to the assumption that the conflict at stake was a result of deficient local structures, 
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and a lack of local capacity to prevent the occurrence of violence. Such assumptions can be 
found in different types of research, from both outsiders
xxx
 and insiders.
xxxi
 In that respect, the 
ability to build such allegedly missing capacities is seen to lie in the hands of often-
internationalised non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as central actors, connected to 
international agencies and through which progress and modernisation can be brought. At the 
same time, these discourses serve to defend the top-down implementation of certain policies 
vis-à-vis grassroots actors. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, the (semi-successful) 
international intervention to reform the police force, mainly conducted through the European 
Union Police Mission (EUPM), reflects the need to ‘de-localise’, and thus ‘de-ethnicise’ 
policing in the country.
xxxii
 This is based on the assumption that the implementation of 
‘universal’ (or, in this case, European) standards to the local context will lead to an 
improvement of local conditions and help overcome oppressive or conflictive practices 
inherent in the ‘local’.  
Similar processes are not least illustrated by the recruitment and employment practices of a 
number of international agencies, such as the Organisation for Security Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) or the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
For instance, according to confidential OSCE sources (international staff), the organisation 
pays much less for local assistants than for international staff, although these local assistants 
are indispensable for the day-to-day work of the organisation, not least as they speak the local 
language(s) and are often deeply embedded in the social networks essential for the work of 
the organisation. In fact, local assistants are needed as they often act as gatekeepers to 
information.
xxxiii
 Such duties are essential for the ‘field’ presence of the OSCE, but are not 
considered (that is, financially rewarded) as much as the task of analysis, which tends to be 
ascribed to international staff. This can be read as a worry of bias of local actors on the part 
of the organisation, and as international staff are perceived as more neutral in terms of being 
outsiders to the conflict, local actors are assumed to be more likely to be biased. Their role is 
therefore often reduced to operational tasks, which may create new dividing lines between 
these two tiers of staff. Such an approach artificially tries to deny any kind of hybridity and 
connectedness between local, national and international actors. It equally denies the subtlety 
of identity, which is not always strictly local or international, but in many cases, a 
construction between the two.  
 
As outlined above, such discourses are often also perpetuated at local level as well. Often, 
there seems to be an ambition to represent and deliver ‘international’ - rather than ‘local’ – 
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skills as part of a larger international (read: Western) toolkit to facilitate conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding. This is particularly striking in Cyprus, where numerous individuals 
involved in any peace-related NGO or movement seem to have a degree from abroad, most 
notably from the US or the UK. Such degrees are seen as high in value, and indeed, even the 
practice of conflict resolution is, rather than being questioned as such, often seen as an 
American toolkit and thus in need of such input.
xxxiv
 As a result, the education from outside 
the ‘local’ context of Cyprus grants the authority to talk about peace and to successfully work 
in this field, and, as numerous people working in the peace sector in Cyprus, particularly non-
governmental, have assured is that without their knowledge from training programmes and 
academic degrees abroad, they would have found it difficult to find a job in this sector. In 
fact, it seems to be an open secret on the island that one has to move abroad for a while if one 
hopes to be employed in this field. This is not least due to the widespread perception (in 
Cyprus, but also beyond) that local skills are inferior to international (or Western) skills, and 
the risk of bias outweighs the benefit of insider knowledge.
xxxv
  
The need to ‘improve’ can also be seen as situated in the fact that working for international 
organisations can lend certain degrees of authority to local actors. An EU official working in 
BiH who is originally from the Republika Srpska (RS), for instance, outlined issues with 
being perceived as biased by fellow Bosnians, given their assumption he would support 
projects in RS more than those in the Federation.
xxxvi
 For him, being part of the EU 
Delegation, and thus the international community as a whole, is a way of regaining some 
form of neutrality in terms of complementing or replacing his local identity with an 
international one. Indeed, the official kept stressing the procedural requirements associated 
with the funding application processes, which, as he stated, mainly come from Brussels and 
are therefore not subject to local bias.
xxxvii
 In that sense, there seems to be a perception that 
being removed from local ‘cooptation’, or ‘manipulation’ lends more authority and 
legitimacy to peace operations as they can then claim more legitimacy in their attempts to 
overcome local conflict. International agency is therefore considered as less biased than local 
agency, thus taking the mandate of intervention and transformation for granted. Delocalising 
one’s identity thus tends to mean an increasing degree of credibility and helps avoid 
accusations of being biased. 
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(Re-)localisation 
 
While we can see tendencies of delocalisation as outlined above, we can equally observe 
processes of (re-)localisation during the course of which local identity is reinforced, often 
used as an economic and political resource. 
Particularly in the context of the local ownership turn, there has been an increasing emphasis 
on the promotion of the local connection of certain projects, mainly from the perspective of 
international donors who imply a higher legitimacy of their projects by localising their 
strategies in different shapes and forms.
xxxviii
 In that respect, the legitimacy of peacebuilding 
activities is directly derived from the local identity of the project, and its rootedness in local 
networks, almost in the understanding of ‘the more local, the more legitimate’.xxxix The 
localisation of peacebuilding projects, which have often been internationally designed, can 
happen in various ways, from the consultation of local stakeholders, as is recently the case 
with a number of projects addressing the redesign of different public,
xl
 to the employment of 
‘local’ staff. In fact, from various interviews with the EU Delegation in Sarajevo, it became 
clear that, although they did not act much differently from their international colleagues, so-
called ‘local’ employees would often emphasise their local connections to the country as a 
way of arguing that this grounds the EU’s work in more local knowledge and legitimacy. 
This can be seen in line with the approach of the EU Delegation in Nicosia, Cyprus, with one 
of their projects being entitled ‘Going Local’. This programme aims to reach out to the 
grassroots in a variety of ways and to bring people together outside the capital city.
xli
 Such 
efforts in turn are intended to promote the legitimacy of the respective institution at local 
level, whilst local identity serves as a gateway to peacebuilding legitimacy. Talentino, for 
instance, points to the importance of investigating the ways in which peacebuilding policies 
are perceived by the respective target societies in terms of whether they manage to respond to 
the interests and ideals of the people.
xlii
 
 
Against this background, the EU’s ‘Going Local’ programme in Cyprus evokes a sheen of 
legitimacy for their engagement as it implies a connection of the institution with its 
surroundings. At the same time, it has been acknowledged that this programme is only 
effective on the Greek Cypriot side.
xliii
 Such an approach of course points to the contested 
nature of the ‘local’, which is never homogeneous, but complex and contested. In that sense, 
it is no secret that the EU’s programme may not be able to cross the divide on the island, not 
least due to legal reasons, but is also situated in a contested Greek Cypriot community.
xliv
 Yet 
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in its institutional reception and engagement, the local is, not always, but often seen as ‘one’, 
and thus a central input factor to peacebuilding programmes. The lack of reflection on who is 
‘local’ and how the ‘local’ can be represented then certainly raises questions of authenticity 
due to the multiple claims to what the ‘local’ includes and excludes.xlv Again, this mirrors the 
complexity of local culture that is produced by a variety of competing, conflictive and 
mutually reinforcing processes, while ‘local subjects engage in the social activities of 
production, representation, and reproduction.’xlvi  
 
At the same time, international organisations pick and choose the actors that they feel 
comfortable working with, that is, organisations which are local on the one hand, but speak 
the language of international organisations on the other hand. For instance, it has been 
suggested that the UN has shaped the bi-communal movement in Cyprus (which has been the 
main conflict resolution tool on the island since the 1990s) as an elitist NGO network, which 
has often created suspicion among the wider local communities
xlvii
 as it is only ‘the usual 
suspects’ who come together.xlviii Such debates tie in with the local ownership literature, 
which discusses the notion of authenticity, that is, the question as to whether the inclusion of 
local key actors into the peace-or state-building process enhances their legitimacy through the 
provision of authentic local values and norms. Such a problem-solving perspective, however, 
has often been considered to cement external intervention on a deep societal level and to 
create a gist of legitimacy, while not necessarily overcoming the power dichotomies between 
local and international actors.
xlix
 It has been criticised as a rhetorical tool rather than deep 
transformation of power relations.
l
 Against this background, being ‘local’ becomes a political 
resource as actors who are ‘most local’ act as gatekeepers to communities and to the political 
legitimisation of projects of intervention. We can therefore observe a commodification of 
local identity, which operates in a market-like environment. ‘Local’ NGOs emerge where 
donor money is available, and donors pass the money to such local partners to cover 
themselves and ensure the lowest possible degree of local resistance.
li
 This, however, is not 
merely a one-way process during the course of which donors dictate the conditions of local 
ownership by themselves. Through the same process of labelling a project as local, local 
actors obtain authority, not only vis-à-vis their own communities, but also vis-à-vis the doors 
themselves as they are able to communicate local needs according to their own perceptions 
and needs. The risk of such processes of gatekeeping have indeed been well-addressed in 
literature around participatory action research.
lii
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This problematique is particularly evident in the context of war tours and dark tourism.
liii
 In 
Mostar (Bosnia-Herzegovina), for instance, one can observe an ever increasing number of 
tours on the famous bridge, which was bombed in 1994 and has been rebuilt in 2004, mainly 
funded by the World Bank. Such tours raise questions around an authentic, local version of 
history, as well as who would be entitled to represent that history to outside visitors. 
Similarly, the walking tours popularly offered to visitors not only in Mostar but also in other 
(post-)conflict zones illustrate the extent to which their local identity gives the tour guides the 
authority to represent the history of the city in question, as Wiedenhoft Murphy has described 
with the example of Northern Ireland.
liv
 Indeed, the tour guides’ very local identity and 
previous involvement in the respective conflict serve as political and economic resources to 
give them the authority to do this job. At the same time, the ambition and decision to act as 
‘local’ representative of a particular historical narrative reflects the tour guides’ agency to 
develop strategies that maximise their access to resources and income. In that sense, it can be 
argued that local identity can become a business factor as well as part of the shaping of the 
position of individuals and organisations in the peacebuilding landscape. It situates actors in 
networks (of tourism, of donor relations, of community positionality) and further determines 
the social links arising out of this jigsaw of local-global networks.
lv
 
 
 
Delocalisation and (re-)localisation in parallel  
 
It may now seem as if actors make a choice between delocalisation or (re-)localisation, 
depending on which option makes more sense in the respective political economy, or that 
these processes happen in a chronological shift. In contrast, I suggest that such processes are 
intertwined and are not mutually exclusive. In the case of Cyprus, such processes seem 
particularly intertwined, where local actors are considered actors who are originally from the 
island, while, as mentioned above, most locals active in peace work have a university degree 
from abroad. The constant redefinition of identity and self-positioning in the network 
between ‘local’ and ‘international’ is thus situated in a space in which different positionalities 
are linked to different social, political and economic outcomes. The question as to whether 
actors position themselves in a local context or not, is subject to a number of factors, such as 
the respective interlocutors and audiences to which they present themselves in one way or 
another.  
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While they are not diametrical opposites, I suggest that both delocalisation and (re-
)localisation are deeply rooted in an Orientalist world view.
lvi
 Local identity is either seen as 
a label of traditionality or even backwardness, or, alternatively, as an idealised, perhaps 
romantic state to be achieved in a particular socio-political context.
lvii
 At the same time, the 
choice to identify oneself as more or less local can also be read as a manifestation of agency 
and a deliberate positioning in the politics of hybrid peacebuilding.
lviii
 To quote but one 
example: I came across an NGO in Bosnia-Herzegovina which can hardly be put in the 
categories of local or international as they operate across spheres. The NGO clearly speaks an 
international language in the sense of professionalisation, which helps represent the 
organisation as internationally legitimised in the field. On the other hand, the organisation is 
keen to emphasise the ‘local’ nature of their projects, which deal with rural communities in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, to communicate to their donors that their work has local legitimacy and 
relevance.
lix
 The positionality as ‘international’, on the one hand, seems to go hand in hand 
with a notion of authority and competence. Local identity, which is, on the other hand, 
performed in parallel, suggests local ownership and legitimacy of projects and facilitates 
access to funding. Delocalisation and (re-)localisation therefore deploy networks, which 
operate at the same time and reinforce different aspects of peacebuilding, including 
credibility, authority, legitimacy and connections to other actors in the field. 
 
 
Local and international: Beyond the binary 
 
Against this background, we can assume that the notion of ‘local’ can be read as an ideal type 
at best, a type of identity which is discursively constituted in the search for peacebuilding 
identity and agency. Rather than a natural given, being ‘local’ can be a rhetorical device, or, 
in a more profound way, a way of positioning oneself in wider peacebuilding networks. 
Identity can therefore become an economic and political resource and is inherently contested 
and fluid. That, however, does not mean that identity is not meaningful. Instead, the position, 
and constant repositioning, of an actor in the networks of peacebuilding reflect not only the 
needs of the actor itself, but also the values and labels associated with being ‘local’ and 
‘international’. In this context, it becomes interesting to ask which label matters most under 
what conditions. This can be seen as particularly relevant in the context of the 2014 protests 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with masses of people openly protesting against the economic and 
political situation in their country. Indeed, many Bosnians have become politically active, 
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citizens’ plenaries have emerged, politicians have been forced to make concessions and some 
of them have even had to resign. This has perhaps come as a surprise to a number of local, 
national and international actors and academics alike who had largely been in agreement 
about the alleged political apathy of (local) Bosnian citizens.
lx
 Along this line of 
argumentation, intentionally or not, ‘local’ Bosnians had been considered as apathetic and not 
involved in politics, often voiced as criticism against Bosnian society. Yet the protests that 
we were seeing in 2014 openly reject this notion of the apathetic local and can instead be 
seen as a reversal of representations. As Jansen shows, the emergence of a civic movement in 
the country seems to have come closer to what almost twenty years of international 
intervention and tutoring has not achieved, namely the construction of democratic structures 
that are locally owned and accountable to the host society rather than international 
institutions.
lxi
 In that respect, the Bosnian movement clearly reflects the need to reconsider 
the labels attached to local identity and reflects an understanding of local politics, which is 
less binary in nature, but instead finds its own responses to the contextual challenges posed 
by the socio-political environment of the state and the region. In that sense, ‘local identity’, 
just as much as international identity, can never be fully and comprehensively established. 
Instead, it evolves and develops contextually in the networked interplay between a jigsaw of 
actors who relate themselves in relation to, and differentiation from, other actors active in 
their field of activity. The self-representation and framing of one’s peacebuilding identity can 
thus only be understood contextually, in the bigger picture of the politics and economics of 
peace at a given point in time. Hence, through their protests, local actors are teaching 
international actors about citizens’ democracy and completely reverse the notion of the local 
as either backward or romantic and point to the need of rethinking seemingly neat categories. 
Such dynamics obviously raise the question of what the West can learn from actors who are 
deemed local and to what extent the locality of the West has to give up its claims to 
international legitimacy.
lxii
  
In such examples, we can see a multidimensional space opening up between international and 
local actors, in which identity categories are not fixed, but in constant transition. According 
to Ley, the local and the global are never separable, but are linked together in the everyday, in 
which we draw on both local and global identities.
lxiii2
 Actors are therefore never just local or 
                                                          
2 What Ley refers to as ‘global’ is what I refer to as ‘international’ in this paper. A conceptual 
differentiation requires more nuance that what this article can achieve. See, for instance, Brühl and 
Rittberger, “From International to Global Governance.” In this context, it should suffice to say that 
peacebuilding has, up to date, remained dominated by state-led policies and has therefore been framed as 
‘international’ rather than ‘global’ in this article.  
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international, but move along the spectrum between them, with economic, political, social 
and cultural forces constantly (re)defining their position in the light of the ‘audience’ to 
which identity is defined. The audience can be local or international communities, donors, 
politicians, or any other key stakeholders in the peacebuilding process. Moreover, as 
particular forms of identification (the local-international range being one dimension of many) 
have a political and/or economic value attached to them, such processes facilitate self-
identification as ‘local’, or ‘less local’, under the respective circumstances. It is especially in 
the field of international peacebuilding where the need to identify oneself along the spectrum 
of local-international identity is essential as far as access to funding, networks, 
communication, legitimacy and authority are concerned. As outlined above, the political 
economy of international peacebuilding is determined by such forms of identification and the 
resources attached to them.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has challenged the notion that peacebuilding identity is stable and can be strictly 
divided into a binary representation of ‘local’ versus ‘international’. It has suggested that 
identities are not primordial, but need to be read in the political, social and economic 
landscape of peacebuilding, which represents the canvas on which actors position themselves 
along multiple lines of identification. This is neither to argue that local actors are 
predetermined by the peacebuilding landscape, nor that they are ‘unruly’ or in need of 
intervention. In contrast, this article has suggested that processes of identity-formation reflect 
the agency of actors to position themselves vis-à-vis the interveners, while also 
acknowledging the complexity of such processes. In that sense, actors legitimately delocalise 
and (re-)localise in different contexts and vis-à-vis different audiences, while such processes 
can even happen in parallel or in chronological shift. Delocalisation supports claims to 
authority and neutrality, while (re-)localisation serves as a way of acting as gatekeepers and 
translators between international actors and the communities intervened upon. As a result, we 
can read the fluidity of peacebuilding identities as a challenge to the notion that 
peacebuilding identities are binary – that is international/local; conflictive/ peaceful; interest-
driven/altruistic. In contrast, what this conceptualisation highlights is the need to 
acknowledge the fact that identities do not remain in neat categories, but transgress 
16 
 
boundaries. ‘Local’ identity is therefore not merely a victim of international intervention, but 
it sets its own conditions and by itself re-shapes international agency and the associated 
categories of meaning. The positioning in one way or another is driven by a variety of factors, 
and is linked to security concerns as well as political, social and ethical questions in terms of 
one’s position in society. In this vein, this article calls for the need to investigate identity and 
agency as processual categories and helps understand the competing understandings and 
usages of the term ‘local’, which is semantic, political, economic, cultural, but also strategic, 
in nature.  
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